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Introduction
The recent global …nancial crisis has resulted in banking crises in a range of countries. As a share of total bank system assets, the biggest bank failures during the …rst phase of the …nancial crisis in 2008=09 were in Iceland (circa 90%) followed by Belgium (53%), Kazakhstan (28%) and the UK (26%) (Laeven and Valencia, 2010) . During the …nancial crisis, the capital of the entire Kazakh banking sector was negative because of the large negative equity of two of the country's largest banks (BTA and Alliance). Because both banks were considered too-bigto-fail the government decided to nationalize them but having done so it turned out they were too-big-to-save and the government declared that it would not guarantee the foreign liabilities of any banks. Consequently, BTA and Alliance defaulted on their foreign liabilities.
The recent turmoil in the banking sector has focused attention on banking performance and, in particular, on the quality of bank assets and credit risk. Many studies of banking performance have attempted to estimate the e¤ect of loan quality and risk on banking e¢ ciency and productivity. The earlier studies analyze the e¤ect of loan quality and banking risk on the e¢ ciency of U.S. banks (e.g. Mester, 1996, and Mester, 1997) . In general, these studies observe a negative relationship between problem loans and banking e¢ ciency. This relationship, however, may be a phenomenon that relates to periods of bad luck, bad management, 'skimping'and moral hazard (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) . More recent studies investigate the risk-performance nexus for European banks. This literature is wide ranging and includes cross country studies (e.g. Iannotta et al., 2007) and studies of banking e¢ ciency in Greece (Pasiouras, 2008) , Japan (Altunbas et al., 2000) , emerging economies (Isik and Hassan, 2002) , East Asian countries (Sun and Chang, 2011 , Kwan, 2003 , and Chiu and Chen, 2009 and transition countries (Havrylchyk, 2006 , Kenjegalieva et al., 2009 , Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998 and Brissimis et al., 2008 .
Using rich monthly data for virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry for a study period (March 2007 December 2010) which includes the …nancial crisis, we draw on the …nancial intermediation approach to apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to …t several functions (cost, revenue, standard pro…t, alternative pro…t and input distance). The …tted functions are used to investigate the e¤ect of the quality and risk of the loan portfolio on the industry best practice frontiers, and the economic and technical ine¢ ciencies of individual banks, whilst controlling for other bank speci…c characteristics. Since the study period includes the …nancial crisis we pay particular attention to the performance of BTA and Alliance.
This paper contributes to the banking literature in four ways. Firstly, whereas most banking studies use the overall level of problem loans and/or provisions for loan losses as proxies for banking risk, we use data which classi…es loans into seven categories according to their quality and riskiness. Speci…cally, two classi…cations are used. The …rst is based on the volume of loans and the second is based on the level of provision for loan losses. Both classi…cations split the bank loan portfolio into standard, bad and doubtful loans with a further …ve sub-categories of the latter. We observe some interesting di¤erences between the e¤ects of the two classi…cations on the industry best practice frontiers and banking ine¢ ciencies. These di¤erences are likely to be because the loan loss provisions classi…cation will re ‡ect not only issuance behavior but also managerial discretion on loan reserves to manipulate pro…t. For this reason we posit that the volume of bad loans as a share of total assets, rather than the ratio of reserves on bad loans to total assets, should be used to monitor the level of non-performing loans in the Kazakh banking sector, which is still a big issue for the industry despite some improvement in this area since the height of the …nancial crisis. Secondly, our approach is similar to Hughes and Mester (1993) and Berger and Mester (1997) but whereas they estimate cost and pro…t functions to analyze the e¤ect of risk on the industry best practice frontiers and bank ine¢ ciencies, we …t a further three functions. In addition, here the modeling of the best practice frontiers takes into account inter-bank heteroscedasticity in ine¢ ciency e¤ects and unobservable heterogeneity in the banks'technologies. Thirdly, to the best of the authors'knowledge this is the …rst study to analyze banking performance in Kazakhstan. It is the largest landlocked country, has substantial oil reserves and in the early 2000s it was one of the fastest growing economies in the world with growth comparable to the East Asian tigers. 1 Fourthly, the determinants of the industry best practice frontiers and banking ine¢ ciencies are used to inform a discussion of the characteristics of Kazakh bank behavior during the recent …nancial crisis. We …nd that an increase in the volume of bad loans as a ratio of total lending has a desirable e¤ect on the cost, input-distance and alternative pro…t frontiers, all of which is consistent with the 'skimping'hypothesis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of banking sector developments in Kazakhstan and in Section 3 we set out the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the data set and in section 5 the empirical results are presented and analyzed. In section 6, we conclude by suggesting how the empirical …ndings can be used to assist in acting on the lessons that have been learnt from the Kazakh banking crisis. 1 In the extant literature Kazakh banks have featured in a number of cross country studies on the a¤ect of …nancial development on banking e¢ ciency (e.g. Turk Ariss, 2010; De Haas et al., 2010; Fries and Taci, 2005) . The …rst of these studies analyses banking e¢ ciency across 60 countries whereas the latter study uses a sample of banks in 15 countries. These studies provide a regional picture of bank e¢ ciency although it is debatable if it makes sense to compare the …ndings of such studies because often the samples are very di¤erent. Interestingly, in the latter study, on average, Kazakh banks are the most e¢ cient in the sample. This …nding provides further motivation for an e¢ ciency analysis which focuses exclusively on Kazakh banks.
Kazakh Banking Sector Development
A modern banking system typically has a decentralized two-tier structure with second-tier commercial banks that are independent of the upper-tier central bank. In 1987, several years prior to the collapse of Soviet Union, the Soviet government formally reorganized the monobank into a two-tier banking system. The State Bank (Gosbank) acted as the central bank. The second tier consisted of specialized commercial banks which were responsible for providing …nancial services to state-owned enterprises. Many branches of the quasi-independent commercial banks severed ties with their parent bank and formed autonomous banking units. In addition, privately-owned banks and …nancial institutions were allowed to enter the industry. This resulted in a rapid increase in the number of registered commercial banks.
In 1991, Kazakhstan inherited this quasi two-tier banking system with 72 second-tier banks. In 1993, Kazakhstan left the ruble area and introduced its own currency (Kazakh tenge, KZT). In the same year the Gosbank was reorganized and the Kazakh central bank, the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NBK), was formed. Initially, as is the case in most transition countries, the new central bank had quite liberal licensing policies which in conjunction with shortcomings in the legal framework and the supervisory system fostered further growth in the number of undercapitalized and potentially nonviable banks. By 1994 the number of banks had peaked at 191. This rapid growth of the banking system, however, did not result in an increase in …nancial intermediation and competition. Hoelscher (1998) posits that there are four reasons for this: (i) in some parts of the country banking was highly concentrated; (ii) there were established working relationships between some banks so competition was not likely to materialize between these banks; (iii) the formation of …nancial-industrial groups deterred entry; (iv) some banks were set up not to compete but for other reasons e.g. to obtain subsidized credit from the NBK.
In the 1990s Kazakhstan experienced severe macroeconomic and …nancial instability. GDP fell by over 25% over the period 1992 94 and in 1994 in ‡ation was 1; 160%. Also, private sector con…dence in the banking sector dissipated rapidly. This is evident because the deposit base as a share of GDP fell from 72% in 1994 to less than 5% in 1996. This coincided with the NBK presiding over a series of reforms of the banking and …nancial system. The reforms included, the introduction of liquidation proceedings which enabled NBK to initiate the liquidation of failing banks. Banking supervision was also tightened and involved more comprehensive on-site inspections, tighter licensing agreements and stricter capital requirements. This resulted in an increase in license withdrawals and a marked fall in the number of new bank registrations. This is borne out by the sharp fall in the number of banks over the period 1995 2005 (see Table 1 ). In 1994 non-performing loans accounted for over 50% of the system's loan portfolio. In light of this a big part of the reforms involved transferring non-performing loans from banks to three debt resolution companies (the Rehabilitation Bank, RB, the Agricultural Support Fund, ASF, and Exim Bank) which were set up by the NBK (IMF, 1998).
[Insert Table 1] Strong economic growth from 2000 2007 (over 10% for some years during this period), which was largely due to growth of the oil sector, fuelled con…dence in many sectors of the Kazakh economy. The rapid growth of the Kazakh economy was accompanied by an increase in the capacity of the Kazakh banking system. Financial deepening also increased sharply in Kazakhstan and was well above the levels in most of the former Soviet Union countries and was only slightly below the levels in the EU accession countries (IMF, 2005) . To illustrate, the lending of commercial banks as a share of GDP increased from 7% in 1999 to 67% in 2007 and over the same period, the ratio of deposits to GDP increased from 8% to 48%.
Although the credit boom in Kazakhstan was accompanied by an increase in the deposit base, the base was not strong. This is because the growing con…dence in the Kazakh banking system and the gradual depreciation of the tenge since 2000 created a strong preference for foreign currency. Moreover, since the demand for credit was growing faster than domestic savings some Kazakh banks, which were rated by international rating agencies, borrowed heavily in international markets at competitive rates to …nance mortgages, consumer loans, loans for real estate construction and loans to facilitate international trade. Consequently, the ratio of foreign currency lending to total lending was high. For example, only 10% of mortgage loans in 2004 were issued in the domestic currency (IMF, 2005) . Because of the availability of foreign currency at relatively cheap rates some Kazakh banks increased their holdings of real estate, investments and …nancial assets abroad. By 2007 the banking sector's external debt was 43:2% of GDP (Barisitz and Lahnsteiner, 2010) . In addition, by the end of 2006 o¤-balance sheet items had grown to over three-quarters of the banking system's balance sheet assets. Despite strong economic growth in Kazakhstan, the reliance of the banking system on external …nance represented a substantial risk which ultimately proved to be excessive.
The sustained credit expansion in Kazakhstan was followed by a severe credit collapse in late 2007. The collapse was severe because the credit bubble had grown so big. Typically a credit bubble in an emerging market is preceded by a credit boom lasting about 3:5 years (IMF, 2004) . In the case of Kazakhstan the credit boom lasted longer than is typically the case which fuelled the growth of the credit bubble. The Kazakh credit crisis was primarily due to moral hazard problems in the Kazakh banking sector because too many risky loans, in particular mortgages, were issued in the credit boom. The U.S. subprime and global …nancial crises made foreign investors more risk averse, there was large scale deleveraging by foreign investors and there was a shift away from investing in real estate, all of which exacerbated the problems in the Kazakh banking sector. This is because Kazakh banks were heavily dependent on external …nance and a large share of Kazakh banks' loan portfolios were …nancing real estate projects. Kazakh banks were unable to roll over their external debts and service sizeable maturing liabilities. Con…dence in the Kazakh banking sector declined and consequently, in
2008 there was a marked fall in household deposits as a share of GDP (see Table 2 ).
[Insert Table 2] Accordingly, domestic liquidity conditions tightened signi…cantly in 2007. To support the liquidity of banks, the NBK reduced reserve requirements and arranged large scale liquidity provisions through foreign exchange swaps, repo agreements and early redemption of NBK notes. Furthermore, the NBK intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market to prop up the tenge. The main vehicle for crisis relief in the Kazakh banking sector and real economy was a newly formed state entity, Samruk-Kazyna (SK). At the end of 2007 the assets on SK's consolidated balance sheet totalled $47 billion (equivalent to 45% of GDP), which were largely from the Oil Fund (IMF, 2009b) .
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Following the sharp depreciation of the Russian ruble, the tenge was devalued by almost a …fth in February 2009 to improve the competitiveness of Kazakh exports, save on foreign currency reserves and decrease the pressure on the domestic currency. After the devaluation of the tenge, the debt-servicing burdens of Kazakh banks, which were already struggling to re…nance foreign funding, increased further. In 2009 10 two large domestically owned banks (the BTA and Alliance banks) and two smaller domestically owned banks (Temir Bank and Astana Finance) stopped making principal payments and were forced to restructure their external obligations (IMF, 2010) . Consequently, international rating agencies downgraded the debt ratings of systemically important Kazakh banks. In addition, by 2009 the ratio of nonperforming loans to total lending across the sector had increased to 38% compared to 7% in
2007.
The sharp increase in non-performing loans and hence the rise in loan loss provisions resulted in almost zero industry pro…t in 2008. Large losses were expected in future years because in 2008 the gap between banks'assets and liabilities was equivalent to 6% of GDP.
In response to the crisis in the Kazakh banking sector, the state holding company, SK, provided direct equity support to the three largest ailing banks so they could recapitalize. In February 2009, SK acquired a majority stake in BTA (75%), the country's largest bank. It also acquired minority stakes in the second and third largest banks, Halyk Bank (21%) and Kazkommertsbank (20%), respectively. In total SK provided $2:2 billion of support to the three largest banks. A further $220 million was set aside to purchase more equity in Halyk Bank and $200 million was earmarked for a stake in Alliance, the fourth largest bank. SK used another $4 billion to support struggling real estate and construction projects, and to …nance SME lending and development of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Furthermore, SK made deposits in the Kazakh banking system which amounted to 1:6% of GDP.
In 2009 BTA and Alliance had massive negative equity which amounted to 12:6% of GDP and was the reason total banking capital was negative ( 915 million KZT). Although BTA and Alliance were nationalized they defaulted on their foreign liabilities because the Kazakh government only agreed to guarantee domestic liabilities. Despite this the dire forecasts of bank runs never materialized. In the second half of 2009 the Kazakh banking sector started to recover and the recovery gathered momentum in 2010. This is because: (i) oil and commodity prices rebounded; (ii) real output growth remained positive because of looser monetary policy; (iii) the debts of BTA and Alliance which they either defaulted on or restructured did not unduly a¤ect the domestic deposit base (IMF, 2010); (iv) limits were placed on banks'foreign exchange borrowing.
The recovery represented a period of relative stability in the Kazakh banking system which fostered a steady improvement in liquidity and gradual rebuilding of the capital base. Nevertheless, the volume of non-performing loans as a share of total lending remains high by international standards which must be addressed to continue the rehabilitation of the Kazakh …nancial system.
Empirical Methodology
The relationship between the quality and risk of the loan portfolio and economic and technical performance in the Kazakh banking industry is investigated using the parametric stochastic frontier framework. Technical e¢ ciency is analyzed by …tting an input distance function, whereas economic e¢ ciency is analyzed by estimating cost, revenue and pro…t (standard and alternative) functions. The modeling assumes that a bank's observed deviation from the frontier is caused by random noise (v) and also possibly ine¢ ciency (u). The former is a symmetric normally distributed idiosyncratic error term which captures sampling, measurement and speci…cation error. Ine¢ ciency, on the other hand, is a one-sided non-negative error term.
We model the industry best practice frontiers by accounting for, …rstly, inter-bank heteroscedasticity in u à la Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995) and secondly, unobservable heterogeneity in banks' technologies by following the 'true SFA' framework (Greene, 2005) . In particular, we model the latent heterogeneity in banks'technologies using bank …xed e¤ects. The observable heterogeneity in banks' technologies is modeled by allowing bank-speci…c characteristics to in ‡uence the frontier. This speci…cation is based on a single-step estimation procedure. It is therefore free from the bias associated with two-stage SFA techniques (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) .
In this section for sake of brevity we only discuss the cost function and its properties. See Appendix A. 1 for the corresponding discussion pertaining to the input distance, revenue, standard pro…t and alternative pro…t functions.
3 The …tted cost functions (i.e. a function for the minimum cost required to produce outputs given the input prices), c(y; w), for N banks over T periods are of the following form:
:::; N t = 1; :::; T; (1) where C it is the observed cost of bank i at time t; y it is a vector of output levels; w it is a vector of input prices; z it is a vector characterizing the quality and risk of bank i's loan portfolio at time t as well as other bank speci…c features. The i parameters are bank …xed e¤ects which 3 Berger and Mester (1997) favor the alternative pro…t function over the standard speci…cation if: (i) there are substantial unmeasured di¤erences in the quality of services provided by banks because the alternative pro…t function holds the quantities of outputs constant and captures di¤erences in quality by allowing output prices to vary; (ii) a bank cannot achieve every output scale and product mix because the quantities of its outputs exhibit very little variability; (iii) the banking industry is imperfectly competitive; (iv) there is likely to be measurement error in the data on output prices.
capture the latent heterogeneity of banks which is not explained by the z variables. The T L function in equation (1) represents the technology as the translog approximation of the log of the cost function and is in terms of the output quantities and the normalized inputs prices. 4 v it is a symmetric normally distributed idiosyncratic error term and u it is a measure of how far away bank i's costs are at time t from the best-practice level associated with the same output quantities being produced under the same conditions. It is assumed that u it follows a truncated normal distribution with a mean it speci…c to each observation. This is a more ‡exible assumption than assuming that u it follows a half-normal distribution (see Stevenson, 1980 , for further details). The heteroscedastic frontier model assumes that it is a function of factors speci…c to bank i (z ). The determinants of the stochastic frontier and u it are therefore simultaneously estimated. Speci…cally, the mean of the ine¢ ciency distribution in equation (1) is speci…ed as follows:
The microeconomic properties of an estimated cost function, c(y; w), are: (i) non-decreasing in outputs, y, @ ln c (y; w) =@ ln y m ey m 0; m = 1; :::; M ; (ii) non-decreasing in input prices, w, @ ln c (y; w) =@ ln w k ew k 0; k = 1; :::; K; (iii) homogeneity of degree one in input prices, w, c (y; w=w K ) = c (y; w) =w K ; (iv) a concave and continuous function in inputs prices, w.
Data
We use rich monthly data obtained from the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial Organizations for the period March 2007 December 2010.
5 Using this data we analyze monthly changes in the performance of Kazakh banks during the …nancial crisis. The data includes …nancial, ownership and prudential information for 37 second-tier commercial banks. The panel is unbalanced and consists of 1; 566 observations covering virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry (99:7%). Only a few small new banks were omitted due to zero values in their deposit and/or loan accounts. We follow the Sealey and Lindley (1977) intermediation approach. Accordingly, the intermediate deposits of commercial banks are split into various categories of earning assets. The inputs in the banking production process are …xed capital (F ixed assets, x 1 ), deposits (Clients 0 deposits, x 2 ) and labor (P ersonnel expenses, x 3 ). The outputs in the production process re ‡ect both the lending and non-lending activities of banks. In particular, the outputs are: total customer loans (Customer loans, y 1 ), investment securities and other securities (Investments, y 2 ), o¤-balance sheet items which is included as an output to capture banks' non-traditional activities (OBS, y 3 ). 6 The data is expressed in real terms at March 2007 prices 4 The translog functional form is used in the model speci…cation as it is more ‡exible than linear functions and captures cost (pro…t) behaviour of banks better. We thank the anonymous referee for the note. 5 In May 2011, the NBK took over the responsibilities of the Agency through the newly formed Committee for the Control and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial Organizations.
6 OBS includes total contingent claims which contain letters of credit, guarantees, deposits and loans placed using the monthly CPI index which was obtained from the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
In the cost and pro…t function speci…cations we use three input prices: the cost of physical capital (P rice of f ixed assets, w 1 ) which is calculated as the ratio of depreciation charges to the value of …xed assets; the cost of borrowed funds (P rice of clients 0 deposits, w 2 ) which is taken to be the ratio of interest expenses on clients'deposits to the volume of clients'deposits; the cost of labour (P rice of labor, w 3 ) which is expressed as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The output prices used in the revenue and pro…t functions are: the price of loans (P rice of customer loans, p 1 ) which is calculated by dividing interest income from loans by total customer loans; the price of other earning assets (P rice of investments, p 2 ) which is expressed as the ratio of interest income on investments and securities to the volume of investments and securities; the price of OBS items (P rice of OBS, p3) which is calculated by dividing income generated from OBS activity by the volume of OBS items.
We capture the quality and riskiness of a bank's lending using two categorizations of its loan portfolio. Both categorizations split a bank's loan portfolio into standard, doubtful and bad loans. The …rst categorization is based on the volume of loans whereas the second uses provisions for loan losses. In both cases there are a further …ve sub-categories of doubtful loans. Doubtful loans are categorized according to the score for the loan contract, where the least risky doubtful contracts are placed in Category 1 and the most risky are in Category 5.
7 ' 8 Using the …rst categorization, the quality and riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio is captured using the ratio of the volume of loans in each category to total lending. Similarly, using the second categorization quality and riskiness is modeled using the ratio of loan loss provisions for each category to total loan loss provisions. It is important to note that there is potential endogeneity issue related to input prices, risk variables and pro…t. The level of input/output prices and banking risk are not completely exogenous because they are to some extent chosen by the bank as part of the bank's management policy. Hence, the possible endogeneity of these variables can bias the coe¢ cient estimates. Therefore, as noted by Berger and Mester (1997) , the presented analyses is suggestive but not conclusive. Along with the risk variables, Z-score of the analyzed banks is included in the analysis to take into account the volatility of earnings. It is calculated as a ratio of the sum of the return on assets (ROA it ) and the capital ratio (CAR it ) divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets over the analyzed period between March 2007 to Dec. 2010 (SDROA i ): i.e. Z score it = (ROA it + CAR it )=SDROA i . In Table 3 , we present the descriptive statistics for the inputs, outputs, prices, loan quality variables and the Z-score.
[Insert Table 3] in the future, possible claims on bills, and the purchase and sale of …nancial derivatives. 7 The score for a loan is calculated according to, among other things: the …nancial condition and rating of the borrower; the quality of the collateral; any extensions to the repayment period; any write-o¤s of the borrower by other creditors; any overdue payments.
8 Details of the …ve categories of doubtful loans are as follows: Category 1 substandard loans with current payments; Category 2 substandard loans with payments in arrears; Category 3 unsatisfactory loans with current payments; Category 4 unsatisfactory loans with payments in arrears; Category 5 doubtful loans.
We also include a number of other z variables to capture the e¤ect of: (i) bank regulation and supervision i.e. dummies which take a value of 1 if a bank complies with prudential capital requirements (P rudential_Req) and limits on foreign currency positions (F orCur Limits); (ii) state ownership vis-à-vis private ownership i.e. a State dummy which takes a value of 1 if a bank is state owned; (iii) bank size as a proxy for international …nancial intermediation and scale of performance i.e. Small, M edium and Large bank size dummies; 9 (iv) negative equity i.e. a N egative Equity dummy which takes a value of 1 if a bank has had negative equity at any point over the sample period.
Results and Analysis
This section consists of four sub-sections. In 5:1 we present the …tted models and discuss the returns to scale estimates. In 5:2 we present and analyze the estimates of economic e¢ ciency (cost, revenue, standard pro…t and alternative pro…t e¢ ciencies) and technical e¢ ciency (inputoriented e¢ ciency) over the sample period using each categorization of the quality and risk of the loan portfolio. Furthermore, in 5:3 and 5:4 we discuss the …ndings on the impact of each categorization of the quality and risk of the loan portfolio on the industry best practice frontiers and the ine¢ ciency estimates. To put the e¤ect of each categorization on the best practice frontiers and the ine¢ ciencies into context we also discuss the e¤ect of other z variables.
Returns to Scale
The estimation results for the two model speci…cations for each function-model 1 (quality and risk of the loan portfolio modeled using the volume of loans categorization) and model 2 (quality and risk of the loan portfolio modeled using the loan loss provisions categorization) are presented in Appendix A.2. We can see from these results that the input, output and corresponding price elasticities for all the …tted functions apart from the standard pro…t function have the expected signs where signi…cant, implying that the monotonicity conditions are not disproved at the sample mean. The returns to scale estimates at the sample mean from the cost function (2:17 and 1:76 for models 1 and 2, respectively), input distance function (3:31 and 3:01 for models 1 and 2, respectively), revenue function (2:15 and 2:04 for models 1 and 2, respectively) and alternative pro…t function (2:78 and 3:17 for models 1 and 2, respectively) are in some cases considerably greater than unity i.e. an average Kazakh bank operates at increasing returns to scale in all eight cases. 10 The above scale elasticities are computed at the 9 The bank size dummies are based on a size categorization of banks according to total assets. In particular, banks are classi…ed as: small -if their total assets are less than 10; 000; 000 (000s) KZT; medium -if their total assets are between 10; 000; 000 (000s) KZT and 1; 000; 000; 000 (000s) KZT; large -if their total assets exceed 1; 000; 000; 000 (000s) KZT.
10 Cost (Alternative pro…t) returns to scale (RT S) can be de…ned as the percentage change in cost (alternative pro…t) as a result of a one percent increase in all outputs. In other words, cost (alternative pro…t) RT S are equal to the reciprocal of the sum of the cost (alternative pro…t) elasticities with respect to the outputs i.e. ( P e y ) 1 . It follows therefore from a …tted input distance function that RT S IDF = ( P e y ) 1 . Revenue RT S can be de…ned as the percentage change in revenue when there is a one percent increase in all inputs i.e. sample mean of the data and are therefore unweighted average measures. A country's banking industry, however, is generally characterized by a large number of small banks where the scale elasticity is high and a small number of large banks where the scale elasticity is low, possibly below one. Therefore, the above unweighted scale elasticities are most probably overestimates due to a large number of small banks in the sample as we use data for virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry. Asset weighted average scale elasticities would be lower than the corresponding unweighted elasticities.
Interestingly, revenue returns to scale from models 1 and 2 are very similar. In contrast, there is a marked change in cost, alternative pro…t and input distance economies of scale depending on whether the measure of loan portfolio quality and risk is the volume of loans categorization or the loan loss provisions categorization. The robustness or sensitivity of economies of scale to the measure of loan portfolio quality and risk is most probably because the economic frontiers are sensitive to the a¤ect of managerial discretion on loan loss provisions which is a tool to manipulate bank pro…t. At the sample mean, investments and OBS items are not the source of the di¤erence between cost returns to scale for models 1 and 2 and between the estimates of alternative pro…t returns to scale because the parameter estimates for these outputs are all small. Our results suggest that the large di¤erence between the cost returns to scale and the alternative pro…t returns to scale from models 1 and 2 is due to …nancial intermediation activities. More speci…cally, we attribute the di¤erences in cost returns to scale and alternative pro…t returns to scale to di¤erences in the marginal e¤ects of customer loan issuance in models 1 and 2.
E¢ ciency Results
Average economic and technical e¢ ciency scores for Kazakh banks over the sample period are reported in Table 4 . In general, the average e¢ ciency scores over the sample period using the volume of loans categorization range from 69% 88%, the exception being the average e¢ ciency score from the revenue function (47%). More speci…cally, the average e¢ ciency score from the cost model over the sample period suggests that the costs of an average bank are 12% above the best practice level. Similarly, mean pro…t e¢ ciency scores over the sample period of 79% and 80% suggest that, on average, banks make about 80% of the pro…t which the best practice bank would make under the same conditions.
[Insert Table 4] The Kruskal-Wallis tests of the null that the e¢ ciency scores from corresponding models (e.g. the two cost models) in Table 4 do not di¤er is always rejected. That said, the di¤erence between the corresponding average standard pro…t and alternative pro…t e¢ ciencies is negligible. Over the sample period there is a 14% di¤erence between the average e¢ ciency scores from the cost functions and there is a 6% di¤erence between the average e¢ ciency scores from the
revenue functions. The corresponding average input-oriented and average revenue e¢ ciency scores are characterized by a somewhat downward trend which is more evident in pro…t e¢ -ciency scores. A downward trend in average economic e¢ ciency and average technical e¢ ciency is to be expected over the …nancial crisis. Average cost e¢ ciencies are presented in Figure 1 . The plot suggests that although there is a considerable di¤erence between the average cost e¢ ciencies from models 1 and 2, there is little di¤erence between the average cost e¢ ciencies at the start of the sample period compared to the end of the period. It is evident from Figure 2 that this is also the case for the average input-oriented and the average revenue e¢ ciencies. It is apparent, however, that the average e¢ ciencies from the standard and alternative pro…t functions at the start of the sample period are well above the levels which we observe at the end of the sample period. Summarizing, this suggests that the …nancial crisis only had a sustained detrimental e¤ect on the average e¢ ciencies from the standard and the alternative pro…t functions.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2]
We can see that average technical e¢ ciency from model 1 is well above that from model 2 for the entire sample period. Conversely, average revenue e¢ ciency from model 2 is much higher than that from model 1 throughout the sample period. The average pro…t (standard and alternative) e¢ ciencies from models 1 and 2, however, are very similar over the whole sample period. It is also evident that the average pro…t (standard and alternative) e¢ ciencies are much more volatile than the other average e¢ ciencies. That said, we observe at least one spike in the other average e¢ ciencies. Over the course of the …nancial crisis there are large isolated temporary changes in the average e¢ ciencies from the cost, revenue and input distance functions. For example, the average cost e¢ ciency from model 1 fell to 66% in August 2008. Average cost e¢ ciency from model 1 once again fell to 64% in October 2009 but on this occasion is was the result of a steady decline over several months. In October 2009, the average cost e¢ ciency from model 2 had fallen to 79%. It is not surprising that the lowest average cost e¢ ciencies are observed in 2009 because it was a very turbulent year for the Kazakh banking industry. As was noted in Section 2, in 2009 the level of non-performing loans increased dramatically and in July 2009 the equity capital of the banking system was negative.
The BTA and Alliance cost e¢ ciencies from models 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 3  and 4 . The cost e¢ ciencies add credence to the anecdotal evidence on the troubles of BTA and Alliance during the …nancial crisis. Apart from the sharp fall in the BTA cost e¢ ciency scores in September 2008, BTA was performing well relative to the industry average up until April 2009, which was when BTA defaulted on its foreign liabilities. From April 2009, the cost e¢ ciency of BTA from both models deteriorates rapidly over a period of several months. By July 2009, BTA's ratio of bad loans to total lending (54%) was the highest in the industry. According to the cost models, in June 2010 BTA was the worst performing bank in the industry with an e¢ ciency score of 6% from model 1 and 31% from model 2.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4] The Alliance cost e¢ ciencies over the sample period follow similar paths to those for BTA. It should be noted, however, that although the Alliance and BTA cost e¢ ciencies started to decline in April 2009, the decline was much more sustained for BTA. This is evident because the Alliance cost e¢ ciencies started to rise in November 2009, whereas the BTA cost e¢ ciencies did not begin to rise until July 2010. This corroborates the view that BTA su¤ered more during the …nancial crisis than Alliance.
Impact of Loan Portfolio Quality and Risk on the Frontiers
The estimates of the e¤ect of each z variable on the industry best practice frontiers and the bank ine¢ ciencies are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . Speci…cally, the estimates in Table   5 are for model 1 (i.e. when loan portfolio quality and risk is measured using the volume of loans categorization) and the estimates in Table 6 are for model 2 (i.e. when loan portfolio quality and risk is measured using the loan loss provisions categorization). A cursory glance at the results indicates that the M edium bank size dummy has been omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. This means that the e¤ects of Small and Large banks are relative to the e¤ect of the M edium size category. Other z variables which are omitted for the same reason are: the ratio of the volume of doubtful loans in the …fth category to the total volume of doubtful loans; the ratio of loan loss provisions in the …fth category to total loan loss provisions; the ratio of the volume of standard loans to the volume of total lending; the ratio of loan loss provisions for standard loans to total loan loss provisions.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6] Turning our attention to the e¤ects of the z variables on the industry best practice frontiers (see the top panels of Tables 5 and 6). It is evident that the ratio of the volume of bad loans to the volume of standard loans has a small e¤ect on each of the frontiers, which is similar in magnitude in corresponding models e.g. both the cost functions. It is surprising that all the BL=SL parameters are so small but this is because the e¤ect of the quality and risk of the loan portfolio is being captured by other variables. The large and signi…cant e¤ects of other variables which measure the quality and risk of the loan portfolio often vary between corresponding models. For example, it is apparent that relative to DL Category 5=DL, DL Category 3=DL has a large negative e¤ect on the revenue frontier and relative to RDL Category 5=RDL, RDL Category 3=RDL has a small positive e¤ect on the revenue frontier. Also, we can see that DL=T A has quite a large negative e¤ect on the alternative pro…t frontier, whereas RDL=T A has quite a large positive e¤ect on the alternative pro…t frontier.
Interestingly, the …tted models suggest that if there is an increase in BL=T A, there will be a big improvement in the cost and input distance best practice frontiers. Also, we …nd that an increase in RBL=T A will have a large positive e¤ect on the alternative pro…t best practice frontier. All these …ndings are consistent with 'skimping'behavior which is where banks allocate less resources to loan screening because they have short run objectives of cost minimization and revenue maximization. This can serve to improve cost and revenue performance in the short term but in the medium to long term it will have a detrimental e¤ect on cost and revenue performance. 'Skimping'has also been used to explain the …ndings of other studies of bank performance in both advanced and emerging economies (e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Delis et al., 2011; Berger et al. 2009 ). In the other models where BL=T A or RBL=T A are signi…cant the parameters have the expected signs. This suggests that an increase in BL=T A or RBL=T A will have an undesirable e¤ect on industry best practice.
Whereas the e¤ect of the BL=SL variable on the best practice frontiers is similar in magnitude in the corresponding models in Tables 5 and 6, this if often not the case for other z variables. N egative Equity, for example, has quite a large positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the cost frontier in model 1 but it does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the cost frontier in model 2. That said, the signi…cant coe¢ cients on N egative Equity consistently suggest that it has a detrimental e¤ect on industry best practice. Furthermore, the signi…cant Small and Large bank size parameters suggest that industry best practice will improve if, relative to the number of medium-sized banks, there are more small and large banks. The Z score parameter is signi…cant in all functions for both models. In particular, in the input-distance and revenue function for both models it has expected positive impact. That is banks with higher Z score, i.e. more stable banks with fewer risk, tend to perform better in terms technical and revenue activities. The negative sign of Z score in the cost function is also expected as it suggests that more stable banks have lower costs. However, when it comes to pro…t functions, the negative sign is at odds with the expectations but in line with the …ndings relating to negative equity in the next sub-section. It suggests that less stable banks with higher risks tend to have signi…cantly higher pro…ts.
Impact of Loan Portfolio Quality and Risk on Ine¢ ciency
Moving onto consider the e¤ects of the z variables on economic ine¢ ciency and technical ine¢ ciency (see the bottom panels of Tables 5 and 6). It is evident that, in general, where the DL=T A and RDL=T A parameters are signi…cant, the e¤ect on ine¢ ciency is negative. The exception is the positive e¤ect which RDL=T A has on cost ine¢ ciency.
Where the BL=T A parameter is signi…cant, the e¤ect on ine¢ ciency is positive. Sun and Chang (2011) also …nd a positive relationship between credit risk and ine¢ ciency for banks in emerging Asian countries. Speci…cally, we …nd that BL=T A has the biggest positive e¤ect on alternative pro…t ine¢ ciency and smaller positive e¤ects on cost ine¢ ciency and revenue ine¢ ciency. This is most probably because, as Berger et al. (2009) note, pro…t e¢ ciency is a more encompassing measure of economic performance and incorporates both cost and revenue e¢ ciency. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in both model speci…cations foreign ownership has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on technical ine¢ ciency and a signi…cant positive e¤ect on cost ine¢ ciency. There is no consensus in the banking performance literature on whether foreign owned banks are more e¢ cient than their domestic counterparts. For example, Jemric and Vujcic (2002) …nd that foreign owned banks in Croatia are far more e¢ cient than domestic banks. Similarly, Weill (2003) …nds that foreign owned banks in Poland and the Czech Republic are more e¢ cient than domestic banks, which he attributes to foreign banks having more human capital and better corporate governance. Conversely, other studies such as Hasan and Marton (2003) …nd that foreign banks in transition economies are less e¢ cient than domestic banks. Lensink et al. (2008) analyze the performance of over 2000 banks in 105 countries and conclude that foreign banks are less e¢ cient than domestic banks. They attribute the di¤erence between the e¢ ciency of domestic and foreign banks to banking system conditions and the economic climate in the relevant countries.
Since the most distressed banks in Kazakhstan were domestic banks, our …nding that foreign owned banks were less cost e¢ cient during the …nancial crisis could well be because they did not engage in 'skimping'. If banks skimp they are likely to allocate fewer resources to underwriting and monitoring loans, thereby saving costs in the short term. Having said this, the quality of the loan portfolio declines because of 'skimping'and the subsequent rise in non-performing loans is likely to increase a bank's costs in the medium to long term. Our results are consistent with foreign banks allocating more resources than domestic banks to screening loans, appraising collateral and monitoring borrowers, rather than 'skimping'on these costs. This would explain why over the sample period foreign banks have a lower ratio of non-performing loans to total lending.
Both of the …tted input distance functions suggest that, relative to medium-sized banks, small banks are more technically ine¢ cient. The second speci…cation of the revenue function also suggests that small banks are relatively ine¢ cient. In contrast, the second speci…cation of the standard pro…t function and the alternative pro…t function suggest that large banks are more ine¢ cient than their medium-sized counterparts. Comparing and contrasting all the above …ndings on the e¤ect of bank size on ine¢ ciency, with the estimates of the e¤ect of bank size on the frontier suggests that an improvement in industry best practice (i.e. the availability of better technology) does not necessarily lead to more e¢ cient bank performance.
The N egative Equity parameter is signi…cant in the …rst speci…cation of the input distance function. The N egative Equity parameters are also signi…cant in the second speci…cation of the cost function and revenue function. As expected all the signi…cant N egative Equity parameters are positive, which suggests that N egative Equity leads to more ine¢ cient performance. This …nding could well be a feature of banking performance during the …nancial crisis because in an earlier study by Hasan and Marton (2003) a positive relationship between the level of equity and ine¢ ciency is observed. Interestingly, our results suggest that N egative Equity does not a¤ect standard pro…t ine¢ ciency, whereas we noted in 5:3 that N egative Equity has a detrimental e¤ect on the standard pro…t frontier in both of the …tted models and on the alternative pro…t frontier in the second speci…cation. This suggests that the large negative equity of a small number of banks during the …nancial crisis a¤ected pro…t best practice at the industry-wide level but not the pro…t ine¢ ciency of individual banks.
Turning our attention to the e¤ect on bank performance of compliance with prudential capital requirements and limits on foreign currency positions. In general, our …ndings suggest that compliance with prudential capital requirements or limits on foreign currency positions has no implications for banking performance. There are, however, four interesting exceptionsthe positive and signi…cant F orCurr Limits parameter in the cost function (Model 1), and the signi…cant positive coe¢ cient on F orCurr Limits in the second speci…cation of the input distance function and negative coe¢ cients in the revenue and standard pro…t function in Model
2.
The positive and signi…cant F orCurr Limits parameter in the …tted model 1 speci…cation of the cost function suggests that more risk averse banks which comply with the limits on foreign currency positions are more cost ine¢ cient. Being more cost e¢ cient in the short term by not complying with the regulations is consistent with banks being less risk averse and 'skimping', which will ultimately erode the quality of the loan portfolio. Hellmann et al. (2000) develop a theoretical model which shows that …nancial liberalization gives rise to such problems. The intuition behind their model is as follows. Financial liberalization promotes entry to the banking industry which intensi…es competition and erodes bank pro…t. The capitalized value of expected pro…ts (i.e. the franchise value) falls and there is less incentive to issue good loans to preserve the franchise value. In their model banks choose between investing in a prudent asset which yields a high expected return or investing in a gambling asset which yields a very high return if the gamble pays-o¤ but if it doesn't depositors bear the cost of the investment. The conclusion which is reached from the model is that following …nancial liberalization there will be a bigger incentive to invest in gambling assets. This model and, in particular, the scenario where gambles do not pay-o¤ is akin to developments in the Kazakh banking sector during the …nancial crisis.
Upon receiving favorable credit ratings from major international credit agencies, many Kazakh banks engaged in a range of new foreign exchange activities. The second speci…cation of the input distance function suggests that banks are more technically ine¢ cient if they are less risk averse and exceed limits on foreign currency positions. Along similar lines, the second speci…cation of the revenue and standard pro…t functions suggests that banks which exceed limits on foreign currency positions are more ine¢ cient. This is most probably because more risk averse banks which comply with limits on foreign currency positions are less exposed to risky foreign currency operations.
Lessons from the Kazakh Experience
Using rich monthly data for virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry over the …nancial crisis, SFA is applied to the …nancial intermediation approach to …t a number of functions. Among other things, from the …tted functions we estimate the e¤ects of two measures of the quality and riskiness of the loan portfolio on the industry best practice frontiers and the technical and economic ine¢ ciencies of individual banks. The determinants of the bank technologies and bank ine¢ ciencies shed light on Kazakh bank behavior over the …nancial crisis. For example, we …nd that an increase in the volume of bad loans as a ratio of total lending has a desirable e¤ect on the cost, input-distance and alternative pro…t frontiers, all of which is consistent with the 'skimping'hypothesis. In the loan loss provisions speci…cations, an increase in the ratio of reserves on bad loans to total reserves has the expected signi…cant detrimental e¤ect on the cost, input distance and revenue frontiers, which is at odds with the 'skimping' hypothesis. Given there is a lot of anecdotal evidence of 'skimping'by Kazakh banks during the …nancial crisis and non-performing loans is still a big concern in the Kazakh banking industry, the ratio of the volume of bad loans to total lending, rather than the ratio of reserves on bad loans to total reserves, should be used by the regulatory authorities to monitor non-performing loans. To conclude, an empirical analysis of Kazakh banking e¢ ciency using non-parametric frontier models with bootstrapping would be a worthwhile and interesting area for further work. 
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A Appendices
A.1 Four Further Functions and their Properties
In addition to cost e¢ ciency which was discussed in Section 3, four other e¢ ciency measures are estimated in this paper. The four other e¢ ciency measures are estimated by …tting an input distance function (IDF), revenue function (RF) and two speci…cations of the pro…t function, standard (SPF) and alternative (APF). These functions have the following forms:
where x is a matrix of inputs in the banking technology; y is a matrix of outputs; w is a matrix of input prices; p is a matrix of output prices; R is a vector of banks'revenues; is a vector of banks'pro…ts; is a constant added to every bank's pro…t so that the natural log is a positive number.
As was the case for the cost function the error components are v and u. Unlike for the cost function, however, the ine¢ ciency term u is subtracted for the other functions. This is because cost ine¢ ciency measures the distance to the minimum attainable cost whereas standard pro…t, alternative pro…t and revenue ine¢ ciency measure the distance to the maximum achievable level. Technical e¢ ciency from a …tted input distance function measures how close a bank's usage of resources is to the minimum attainable level of inputs. Given the input distance function is an input requirement function multiplied by 1, ine¢ ciency is subtracted rather than added.
Information on the quantities of inputs and outputs is needed to represent the production technology using the input distance function, D I (y; x). D I (y; x) is de…ned according to the input set and satis…es the following properties:
(i) non-decreasing in inputs x, @ ln D I =@ ln x k ex k 0; k = 1; :::; K; (ii) non-increasing in outputs y, @ ln D I =@ ln y m ey m 0; m = 1; :::; M ; (iii) homogeneity of degree one in inputs x, D I (y; x=x K ) = D I (y; x) =x K ; (iv) concave and continuous function in inputs x. Estimating the revenue function, r(x; p), is based on the assumption that producers attempt to maximize their revenue. Information on inputs and output prices is required to estimate the revenue function. The revenue function satis…es the following properties:
(i) non-decreasing in output prices p, @ ln r (x; p) =@ ln p m ep m 0; m = 1; :::; M ; (ii) non-decreasing in inputs x, @ ln r (x; p) =@ ln x k ex k 0; k = 1; :::; K; (iii) homogeneity of degree one in output prices p, r (y; p=p M ) = r (y; p) =p M (iv) convex and continuous function in output prices p. To …t the standard pro…t function, (p; w), information on input and output prices is required. The standard pro…t function has the following properties:
(i) non-decreasing in output prices p, @ ln (w; p) =@ ln p m ep m 0; m = 1; :::; M ; (ii) non-increasing in input prices w, @ ln (w; p) =@ ln w k ew k 0; k = 1; :::; K; (iii) homogeneity of degree one in output prices p and input prices w, (w; p=p M ) = (w; p) =p M and (w=w K ; p) = (w; p) =w K ;
(iv) convex and continuous function in output prices p and input prices w.
The right-hand side of the alternative pro…t function is the same as the right-hand side of the cost function. The standard and alternative pro…t functions have the same dependent variable. The alternative pro…t function, (y; w), therefore holds output levels constant, as is the case in the cost function, and allows output prices to vary and in ‡uence pro…t. The properties of the alternative pro…t function are:
(i) non-decreasing in outputs y, @ ln (y; w) =@ ln y m ey m 0; m = 1; :::; M ; (ii) non-increasing in input prices w, @ ln (y; w) =@ ln w k ew k 0; k = 1; :::; K; (iii) homogeneity of degree one in input prices w, (y; w=w K ) = (y; w) =w K ; (iv) convex and continuous function in input prices w. All the functions …tted here contain the translog approximation of the relevant function. The general form of the translog approximation of each function for panel data at time t is as follows:
T L (a; b) = 0 la + 0 lb + 1 2 Ala 0 la + 1 2 Blb 0 lb + la lb + 1 t + 1 2 2 t 2 + 0 lat + 0 lbt;
where la = ln(a); lb = ln(b); 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated; 0 , 0 , 0 and 0 are vectors of parameters to be estimated; A, B and are matrices of parameters to be estimated. The signs of the elements of 0 and 0 indicate whether the monotonicity conditions of T L(a; b) are satis…ed.
A.2 The Fitted Functions
Estimation results for model 1 (volume of loans categorization) 
